We study the fixation probability of a mutant type when introduced into a resident population. As opposed to the usual assumption of constant population size, we allow for stochastically varying population sizes. This is implemented by a stochastic competitive Lotka-Volterra model. The competition coefficients are interpreted in terms of inverse payoffs emerging from an evolutionary game. Since our study focuses on the impact of the competition values, we assume the same birth and death rates for both types. In this general framework, we derive an approximate formula for the fixation probability ϕ of the mutant type under weak selection. The qualitative behavior of ϕ when compared to the neutral scenario is governed by the invasion dynamics of an initially rare type. Higher payoffs when competing with the resident type yield higher values of ϕ. Additionally, we investigate the influence of the remaining parameters and find an explicit dependence of ϕ on the mixed equilibrium value of the corresponding deterministic system (given that the parameter values allow for its existence).
Introduction
The evolutionary dynamics of a mutant strain in a resident population is a well-studied topic in the field of population dynamics. Results concerning the fixation probability, the average fixation time or coexistence behavior can be applied in various biological fields, e.g. population genetics, bacterial evolution, viral dynamics or cancer initiation [Now06, ALM15] . While the first theoretical analysis of such processes relied on deterministic differential equations, over the course of time more detailed models were studied describing the stochasticity of microscopic processes on the individual level. These individual based models can be approximated by the replicator equation (in the large population size limit) or be modeled by birth-death processes (in the case of two types) [Now06, San10] . However, the dynamical evolution of the entire population is mostly neglected in these kinds of models and a constant population size is assumed instead. On the other hand, in population genetics and theoretical ecology, studies focused more on the effect that population dynamics have on the fixation probability rather than the concrete interaction mechanisms between the mutant and wild-type individuals [Ewe67, KO74, OW97]. More recently, researchers started investigating models connecting the stochastic interaction between individuals and stochastic population dynamics from a theoretical point of view [Lam05, Lam06, CL07, PQ07a, PQ07b, MCF10, CMF11, GMR13, CRMT16]. For a historical overview on the calculation of fixation probabilities, see [PW08] . To our knowledge, the first analytical approximation of fixation probabilities under stochastically varying population sizes is due to Lambert [Lam05, Lam06] . In these papers, the author analyzes models of interacting species by considering the corresponding diffusion equations under the constraint of weak selection. Going one step back on the descriptive scale and analyzing the Kolmogorov forward equation instead of its diffusion approximation, Champagnat and Lambert study the effect of various model parameters on the fixation probabilities and extend the previous results [CL07] . In parallel to these studies, Parsons and Quince examined the effect of variable growth rates on the fixation probability and mean fixation time in a two species system with stochastically varying population size [PQ07a, PQ07b]. These results were later complemented and refined in [PQP10] . Instead of focusing on variable growth rates, in this paper we concentrate on the effect of variable competition coefficients on the fixation probability. The model we will work with was introduced in [HHT15] . It is a generalized two-type stochastic Lotka-Volterra-model which connects an evolutionary game with the competition coefficients of the model. Individuals of both species reproduce at constant rates and die spontaneously or based on competition within and between species. This leads to stochastically induced demographic fluctuations driven by interactions within the population. Our goal is to calculate the probability that a mutant takes over such a population of changing size. Recently, further models have been studied which connected game theoretical dynamics with exogenous population growth. For instance, Ashcroft et al. [ASGG17] consider a model with deterministic cell growth defined by a power law and stochastic species interactions derived from an evolutionary game. The authors rely on simulation results suggesting that the evolutionary outcome not only depends on the game played by the species, but also on the growth exponent of the power law governing the population growth. Constable et al. [CRMT16] study a public goods model. The authors analyze the invasion probability of producers and non-producers of the public good again under varying population sizes. Using a time-scale separation under a weak selection approximation, they find that producers can successfully invade a colony of non-producers even though they have a lower fitness than the resident type. The present paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we describe the generalized Lotka-Volterra-model and restate some basic properties of the system, which were already described in [HHT15] . In Section 3 we apply tools developed by Lambert [Lam06] in order to derive a formula for the fixation probability in the weak selection limit. This allows us to interpret the impact of the competition coefficients separately. Furthermore, we compare the results for various competition matrices induced by different games with each other, i.e. the differences between coordination, coexistence and dominance games. Finally, in Section 4 we examine the fixation probability of a single mutant in a wild-type population, which allows us to compare our findings with those obtained in the previously studied settings, e.g. in finite but fixed population sizes.
Model
The model we consider is a competitive Lotka-Volterra system consisting of two types, the mutant X and the wild-type Y . We assume a well-mixed population, i.e. dynamics do not depend on the spatial arrangement of individuals, and a discrete state space describing the number of individuals of the two types, X and Y .
The evolution of the system is described by birth, death and competition processes, which we assume can be written in terms of chemical reactions. Each individual of the two types can reproduce or die independently of the other individuals. This leads to four reactions for the birth-death-processes,
Here, β X , γ X and β Y , γ Y denote the birth and death rates of the mutant and the wildtype, respectively. Additionally, each individual competes with the other individuals and might die due to this process. These reactions occur at the rates
where M controls the total population size in stationarity. Later on, we interpret the competition rates as inverse payoffs of an evolutionary twoplayer game with payoff matrix
This interpretation of the competition processes and a descriptive study of the stochastic competitive Lotka-Volterra system as well as a stability analysis of the stationary points of the corresponding deterministic system was performed by Huang et al. in [HHT15] . This setup has the advantage that the average size of a monomorphic population reflects the payoffs. For example, a population of cooperators would be larger than a population of defectors, reflecting the fitness values within the population. The differential equations of the deterministic model read
For a > c and d > b as well as for a < c and d < b, these equations have an internal stationary point where both species exist. It is given by
Its stability depends on whether a coordination (a > c and b < d) or a coexistence game (a < c and b > d) is played. Additionally, we see that M indeed characterizes the scale of the total population size. In the following, we will work with the fraction of mutants in the whole population given by p = x x+y . We denote the steady state of this value by
Our goal is to extend the analysis of this particular system by approximating the fixation probability of the mutant type X in a population of Y individuals. The techniques we use rely on the theory of stochastic diffusions, see e.g. [Ewe04] . Hence, we will work with the diffusion approximation of the above system; for a detailed derivation see Appendix A. Letting X(t) and Y (t) be the number of mutant and wild-type individuals at time t, respectively, and setting x(t) =
M we find 
(2.5)
We now proceed in deriving the fixation probability of the mutant type X.
Fixation Probabilities
The main result of this paper is the approximation of the probability of a mutant strain to fixate in a resident population of randomly fluctuating size under weak selection. Note first that due to the competition coefficients neither of the two species is able to go to ∞ and hence each of them will die out at a (finite) random time [Lam06] . We define fixation of the mutant X as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Fixation). Species X fixates if for some t ≥ 0 we have y(t) = 0 and x(t) > 0.
In order to quantify the fixation probability we make use of the generator description of the model. Let ϕ(x 0 , y 0 ) be the fixation probability of species X if the initial typefrequencies are x 0 and y 0 . Then standard diffusion theory, see also [Ewe04, Gar04] or Appendix B, implies that ϕ solves
In order to solve this partial differential equation we first do a parameter transformation to the coordinates p = x x+y and z = x + y, the fraction of X-individuals in the population and the whole population size, respectively. Given the same birth and death rates for both species, i.e. β X = β Y = β and γ X = γ Y = γ, and noting that
the generator transforms to (the detailed calculations are given in Appendix C)
From now on, we drop the indices of p 0 and z 0 since the fixation probability always depends on the corresponding initial values.
Our goal is to approximate the solution of equation (3.3). Therefore, we start with the neutral setting which forms the basis of the subsequent calculations.
Neutral model
In formal terms, a neutral setting is given when individuals are exchangeable under labelling which in our case is equivalent to choosing a constant competition matrix, i.e. a = b = c = d. In this scenario the generator in equation (3.2) simplifies tõ
SolvingGϕ neu (p, z) = 0 with boundary conditions
we obtain ϕ neu (p, z) = p, the standard fixation probability of a mutant in an evolutionary process without selection.
Fixation probability under weak selection
Based on the result of the neutral setting we approximate the fixation probability ϕ(p, z) in the case of weak selection. In our model, this translates to the coefficients of the competition matrix being similar. To be more concrete we need the following conditions
In the following we will make use of asymptotic notation, i.e.
We now state our main result. 
where ψ(z) is independent of the initial frequency of mutants p and solves It seems remarkable that the initial population size does not affect the qualitative behaviour of the fixation probability. However, the initial frequency of the mutant compared to the internal steady state and the payoffs b and d can change the sign of the first order effect under weak selection. An interesting application is to consider fixation out of the neighbourhood of the internal steady state. Precisely at that point, we have for φ(p * , z) = p * , as expected. For p = p * + ε, we find
which implies that the fixation probability out of a neighborhood of a stable steady state p * (d < b) is smaller than neutral for positive deviations in p and larger than neutral for negative deviations in p. On the other hand, for an unstable steady state p * (d > b), the fixation probability out of the neighbourhood is larger than neutral for positive deviations in p and smaller than neutral for negative deviations in p. For a detailed study of fixation probabilities when leaving the deterministic steady state see also [?] . Next, we investigate different competition parameter constellations, i.e. conditions on the evolutionary game. We consider the following cases . In fact, p * does not even exist. Instead we will replace condition (iv) by an adapted version which then gives a similar approximation, see equation (3.9).
Coexistence and Coordination Games
In this section, we compare the resulting fixation probabilities in a coexistence and coordination game with the neutral fixation probability ϕ neu (p, z) = p. In order to do so we need a Lemma characterizing the impact of the initial population size which we prove in Appendix E. Remark 3.5. In fact the function ψ is a growing function in z as can be seen in Figure 1 . This basically means that a larger initial population size affects the fixation probability stronger than an initially small population size where demographic effects are negligible. Now, we can state some immediate consequences of the fixation probability which follow from equation (3.4).
Corollary 3.6 (Impact of competition parameters). Given the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 we find the following:
1. For arbitrary a, c > 0 and p < p * we have that ϕ > ϕ neu iff b > d.
2. The probability of fixation is an increasing function in the competition parameter a. Proof. Part 1. follows immediately by comparing ϕ neu with ϕ from equation (3.4) and Lemma 3.4. For part 2., we differentiate the representation of the fixation probability from equation (3.4) with respect to a which gives
The last inequality holds for all choices of the parameter values which finishes the proof.
Remark 3.7. The first statement of the Corollary has the obvious implication that for a mutant to invade a resident population it is important to perform well against the wild-type. This also implies that species with lower single species equilibria (i.e. a < d) can have a higher chance of fixating than neutral. This can end up in an overall decrease of the overall population size. But still, as the second part of the Corollary shows, species with higher single-species equilibria also have a higher chance to fixate.
Before turning to dominance games we take a brief look at some special cases in the context of coexistence and coordination games. 
Symmetric and Asymmetric Games
Additionally, note that in this case we do not need assumption (iv) for the solution of the generator equation in (D.1). For an illustration of the fixation probability with some simulated data points, see Figure 2 . For coexistence games (b > d) the fixation probability lies above the neutral line while for coordination games (b < d) the fixation probability is lower. Obviously, choosing b closer to d improves the analytical prediction due to the weak selection approximation in conditions (i)-(iii). Figure 2: The figure shows the fixation probability from equation (3.7) compared to the neutral fixation probability given by the dashed line. For coexistence games it is higher whereas in coordination games it is lower than the neutral values. For asymmetric games, i.e. we still assume a = d but now b = c, we obtain similar results. In this case, the fixation probability is given by
b < 1 (coexistence) the resulting fixation probability again lies below or above the neutral value, respectively, see also Figure 3 . As already mentioned the condition for invasion, i.e. ϕ asym > ϕ neu is b > d. This means that for a mutant to fixate in the resident population, it is primarily important to have a high payoff when playing against the resident, i.e. the more abundant type. However, when comparing ϕ sym and ϕ asym we see that here the parameter c does play a role. To be more precise, whenever b > c we have ϕ asym > ϕ sym . This condition resembles the shifting of the internal equilibrium of the deterministic system towards the mutant-axis, i.e. 
Dominance Game
In contrast to the coexistence and coordination game the dominance game does not have an internal equilibrium in its deterministic counterpart. This is due to one strategy strictly dominating the other. In terms of parameters this means that either a > c and b > d or a < c and b < d hold. As already mentioned, for the analysis of the fixation probability it does not make sense to assume condition (iv) which states that the internal equilibrium should be close to 1 2 . Hence, we can already infer that the analytical solution will not intersect with the neutral line due to one strategy being favored independently of its frequency. For the calculation of ϕ dom we still assume conditions (i)-(iii) but instead of condition (iv) we need the following:
This is plausible since the fraction in the last term should approximate −1 when considering a dominance game under weak selection, i.e. either c > a and d > b or c < a and d < b.
Theorem 3.8. Under conditions (i)-(iii) and (v), we find
where ψ(z) satisfies
(3.10)
The proof is an imitation of the proof of Theorem 3.2 and therefore spared out. We see that indeed ϕ dom is always larger or smaller than ϕ neu dependent on b being larger or smaller than d, respectively. This finding is rather trivial, since we consider a dominance game and b > d ensures the mutant being advantageous. More importantly, equation (3.9) allows to calculate the first order approximation of the neutral result.
Fixation of a single mutant
In this section, we consider the case that p = 1 zM , i.e. initially there is exactly one mutant present in the population. This is probably the most realistic scenario as seen from a biologist's perspective. In contrast to the previous section we again focus on coexistence and coordination games, but now vary the initial population size instead of the number of mutants. As can be seen in Figure 4 the probability of fixation is a decreasing function of the initial population sizes. This translates to the already observed fact that fixation of a mutant strain is more likely in a growing population than in a decreasing one, cf. [KO74]. This can also be inferred from the formula describing the fixation probability since we are working in the weak selection limit, i.e. the governing part of ϕ(p, z) is the initial frequency of mutants, here 1 zM , which is decreasing for increasing z. In models with constant population size N , the fixation probability of a mutant strain can be translated to the location of the mixed equilibrium of the corresponding replicator equation. More specifically, a mutant has a higher probability than neutral, i.e. In the present implementation, a competitive Lotka-Volterra system, of a model with varying population size this simple rule does not hold anymore. Instead, the invasion probability only depends on the competition rates b and d describing the competition pressure of the species due to the resident type. However, this does not imply any properties of equilibria in the corresponding deterministic system. Even more, the choice of the parameters a and c does not affect the fixation probability when compared to the neutral case as was already pointed out in Corollary 3.6. Thus, in the present model the difference between the neutral fixation probability and the probability of fixation under [ASGG17] , suggesting that a similar relation between fixation probability and the deterministic steady states does not exist in models with varying population size.
Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this manuscript is the analysis of the invasion of a mutant strain when introduced into a wild-type population. Assuming a constant population size or deterministically varying population sizes this quantity has already been studied extensively. Here, we extend the analysis to systems including stochastic demographic fluctuations. Dealing with a competitive Lotka-Volterra model we are able to approximate the fixation probability under the weak selection assumption, i.e. the interaction rates between individuals just differ slightly. Therefore, we approximate the model in terms of stochastic diffusions and apply tools from stochastic diffusion theory to obtain an expression for the fixation probability. We observe that the evolutionary success of a mutant mainly depends on its wild-type competition rate b. This is due to the resident type being more frequent initially yielding a higher probability for a mutant individual to interact with a resident type. This implies that a larger payoff for the mutant interacting with the wild-type ensures an enhanced fixation probability. This can be seen explicitly by the factor (1 − . Under variation of c the fixation probability stays above or below the neutral fixation probability dependent on the choice of b. This is not true when we change b but set c to a constant value. This illustrates that indeed the evolutionary chance for a mutant to fixate is qualitatively independent of c and completely determined by b and d. Parameter values are:
tion (3.4) which is the only term in the formula that can switch the sign given an initially rare mutant, i.e. p < p * . Still, the values a and c play a role in the overall evolutionary picture. While lowering c increases p * and thus the region where the invading type has a selective advantage, the parameter a has an impact on the overall population size after fixation of the mutant strain. This might end in a decrease of the total number of individuals if a < d, even though the mutant has a selective advantage over the wild-type due to b > d. Furthermore, we studied the fixation probability of exactly one mutant in the initial population. Non-surprisingly and as already observed in systems with deterministic population growth/decrease, cf.
[KO74], we see that the fixation probability monotonically decreases for increasing initial population sizes. Additionally, we find that in our system due to the varying population size the famous 1 3 -rule for fixed population size, see [NSTF04], does not hold anymore. However, we can relate the deterministic equilibria to the intersection of the neutral fixation probability and its counterpart including selection, i.e. ϕ neu (p, z) = ϕ(p, z) if and only if p ∈ {0, 1, p * }. The evolutionary result of populations under stochastically fluctuating population sizes has been studied in various scenarios over the last few years [MCF10, CN15, CRMT16] . The stochasticity of the system as opposed to a deterministic modeling approach allows for different asymptotic behaviors and especially can reverse the deterministic behavior. This triggers the question for calculating fixation probabilities. We added some additional insight on the impact of the competition parameters on the fixation probabil-ity. Additionally, we showcase a method from stochastic diffusion theory and developed in [Lam06] for approximating this quantity at least in the weak selection limit. Even though it is limited to the study of two interacting species, it is adaptable to many other models (and not only Lotka-Volterra-type systems) which include stochastic variation on the population size level.
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A. Derivation of the diffusion approximation
We derive the Focker-Planck equation corresponding to our model. The birth-and deathprocesses are given by
with β X , γ X and β Y , γ Y being the birth and death rates. The competition processes read
with M scaling the population size in stationarity. We follow the derivation of the Focker-Planck equation as done in [HHT15] for the very same model. We set
as the transition rates of the system and calculate the infinitesimal generator
of the process applied to a function f (X t , Y t ) dependent on the state (X t , Y t ) at time t (E[·] denotes the expectation of the stochastic system). Note that for f (X t , Y t ) = 1 {Xt,Yt} we retrieve the master equation. We obtain
Rescaling the parameters, i.e. setting x = X M and y = Y M , we get
In the following we neglect the time subscript of the variables x and y. Then, doing a Taylor expansion of the the function f and the transition rates T around (x t , y t ) up to the second order yields
Inserting the terms for the transition rates T 
B. Derivation of the fixation probability
Given the probability density p (x 0 ,y 0 ) (t; x, y) which describes the probability of the system given by the equations in (2.4) to be in state (x, y) at time t if started in (x 0 , y 0 ) the fixation probability is given by
From [Lam05, Theorem 3.5] we know that the population described by the dynamics in equation (2.4) (or more generally a logistic Feller diffusion) goes extinct almost surely for times t large enough. Since then p (x 0 ,y 0 ) (t; 0, 0) → 1 for t tending to infinity, the fixation probability ϕ(x 0 , y 0 ) = lim t→∞ ϕ(t; x 0 , y 0 ) satisfies
On the other hand we have
where the operatorG is given in equation (3.2). Hence, we need to solveGϕ = 0 with boundary conditions ϕ(0, y) = 0 and ϕ(x, 0) = 1 for x, y > 0 which follow immediately from the model dynamics which then gives the partial differential equation with boundary conditions as stated in equation (3.1).
C. Derivation of transformed generator
The generator of the system of stochastic differential equations given in equation (2.4) reads
Doing a parameter transformation from the amount of individuals of each type (x, y) to the fraction of mutants p = x x+y and the total population size z = x + y we need to translate the derivatives into the new coordinate system. Now we have x = pz and y = (1 − p)z which yields Hence, the generator changes tõ
Setting β X = β Y = β, γ X = γ Y = γ and noting that (p * 
